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This Article aims to supply policymakers and jurists with an
ideologically-neutral framework for evaluating the legitimacy of
imposing public interest duties on today’s dominant
communicative technologies, such as Netflix, YouTube, or
Facebook. In contrast to current literature, which often advocates
for adopting either a libertarian or a distributive position about
communication policies and free speech values, this Article
suggests an ideologically-neutral, fact-based examination for
evaluating the various sources of legitimacy with regard to both
“old” and “new” media regulation.
The first Part of the Article begins by adopting a sociohistorical perspective to taxonomize consensual sources for
legitimizing media regulation within the public interest framework.
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By unraveling these various rationales and justifications, it further
examines the sources’ theoretical and practical applicability to
contemporary debates about the constitutional permissibility of
regulating internet-based content providers and platforms. The
second Part suggests that, although both utilitarian-economic and
egalitarian-democratic justifications for traditional media
regulation can generally apply to new forms of commercial media,
free speech jurisprudence lacks sufficient consensus about the
conditions for the legitimacy of such regulation, as it suffers from
two primary flaws: (a) lack of rationality or basis in social facts;
and (b) lack of sensitivity to the hidden constitutional costs of
media regulation within the public interest framework. The third
Part of the Article offers a consensual framework for bridging
today’s ideological divides—over media regulation and free
speech jurisprudence alike—by suggesting common ground for
evaluating the legitimacy of media law and policy, which both
libertarian and egalitarian ends of the liberal-democratic
spectrum can support.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary mass media, from television to online content
providers and platforms, are an inseparable part of contemporary
human society.1 They function as mediators of politics, culture,
and information; thus, they possess a unique social power to
influence our lives and thoughts. The centrality of masscommunicative technologies to the wellbeing of individuals and
society at large comprises both the engine and barrier of its
regulation. In fact, ever since the appearance of mass
communicative technologies at the beginning of the twentieth
century, the regulation of “the media,” in contrast to “the press,”
has always been viewed as a necessary (and thus, legitimate)
governmental activity.2 In practice, governments have regulated
the twentieth century’s mass media in ways that were either
impossible or perceived as illegitimate concerning the printed
media in the modern era.3 Back then, communication law and
policy were coextensive with broadcast regulation. Prime examples
of the unique coercive powers that the state used over the dominant
electronic media of the twentieth century are rules that prohibited
unlicensed media activities, ownership limitations, and access

1
See Vineet Kaul, Changing Paradigms of Media Landscape in the Digital Age, 2 J.
of Mass Comm. & Journalism 110 (2012).
2
See infra Part II.
3
For a critical analysis of the justifications for heavier regulation on broadcasting, in
comparison to the commercial press, see ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1995) (identifying the justifications for heavier regulation of
broadcasting, in comparison to the commercial press, as largely contingent upon
historical circumstances and constitutional form and tradition, rather than resting upon
clearly defined principles).
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rules, as well as regulations stipulating negative and positive
content duties.4
This Article suggests an analytical toolkit for evaluating the
permissibility and desirability of regulating the new mediators that
have replaced the traditional media. Today, both policymakers and
jurists are engaged with new challenges when considering the
legitimacy of regulating the emerging communicative technologies
of the twenty-first century—such as Netflix, YouTube, or
Facebook, which are rapidly replacing traditionally regulated
media.5 The regulatory responses to the twenty-first century
developments are still a work in progress: while in the United
States, new media such as Netflix or YouTube are not subjected to
the same vast regulatory regime as broadcast,6 the European Union
and its member states responded by applying the same regulatory
framework to traditional and online media since the enactment of
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive in 2010,7 and its further
update in November 2018.8
4

Negative content duties are prohibitions or limitations on defined “bad” or harmful
content, such as graphic violence, nudity, or indecencies. Positive content duties are
duties that coerce the media to supply defined regulatory-prescribed “positive” content,
such as news, children’s programming, or local content. For discussion of the typical
content duties of any media regulation and their rationales, see infra Part II.
5
See Stuart Cunningham & David Craig, Online Entertainment: A New Wave of
Media Globalization, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 5409 (2016).
6
See 1 BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TV § 1:23 (“These newer competitors do not have a
regulatory regime affecting their video content per se, unlike cable and DBS. Instead, the
regulatory issues often revolve around the technology bucket into which they fall:
licensing and interference issues for cellular and other mobile video or access or
nondiscrimination for broadband video providers traveling over another’s network.”).
7
Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March
2010 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media
Services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [hereinafter AVMSD].
8
Directive 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November
2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the
Provision of Audiovisual Media Services in View of Changing Market Realities (Nov. 14,
2018). On November 6, 2018, the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and
Education adopted an update for the AVMSD to include further regulation on matters
such as protection of minors, prohibition of hate speech, promotion of European works
and extending the scope regulation to video-sharing platforms.
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The need to further develop the theoretical and doctrinal
foundations of media law and policy emerges from the most
consensual conclusion from the century-long experience with
regulation of the electronic media: in the absence of clearly defined
rationales and objectives for regulation, there can be no clear
notion of how to evaluate its political or constitutional legitimacy.
Achieving this clarity is the aim of this Article.
At present, following a century-long experience with media
regulation, the core questions of media law and policy—why,
whom, and to what end should we regulate?—remain highly
contested with regard to both the “old media” and new
communicative technologies. The preliminary argument of this
Article is that, in order to evaluate the legitimacy of both “old” and
new media, it is necessary to understand these regulations’ political
and constitutional rationales and examine their applicability to the
new online mediators of information, politics, and culture.
The historical rationale (or justification) for creating a vast
apparatus of state regulation over the electronic media during the
twentieth century was the scarcity argument, which was conceived
with regard to broadcast media (radio and television). In short, this
practical reason for prohibiting unlicensed broadcast activity was
that, without central control over the allocation of broadcast
frequencies, there could be no effective or valuable use of
broadcast.9 Alternately stated, regulation was justified as a
necessity, because of the unique technical nature of the broadcast

9

See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 204 (1994) (“Scarcity—the need to ration licenses—was the first and
remains the foremost rationale for the disparate application of the First Amendment to
broadcasting [in comparison to the press]”); Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, Justice,
and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John
Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137, 140 (2007)
(Describing scarcity as the guiding principle in regulating the “old” media [broadcast
radio and television]. Scarcity, in this context breaks down into “physical/technological
scarcity,” as determined by either technological or economic constraints; and “content
scarcity,” as reflected either in the number of conduits for content or in the diversity of
content within those conduits).
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spectrum, in which “with everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard.”10
This coordination problem, as the historical reason or
justification for creating a unique regulatory apparatus over the
electronic media, is mostly obsolete. Since the end of the twentieth
century, the dominant audio-visual media use digital delivery
methods (such as cables or internet-based delivery), to which the
scarcity argument for media regulation does not apply.11 Hence,
broadcast media and the scarcity rationale play a very limited role
in the twenty-first century’s media landscape, since digital mass
media services and platforms are rapidly replacing broadcast as
primary social channels for mediating information, culture, and
politics to the public.
Now, more than ever, policymakers, judges, and citizens need
analytical tools for evaluating the legitimacy or desirability of
regulatory practices over the many forms of new mass media. To
do so, it is necessary to look back at the century-long experience of
media law and policy (and its judicial review), and to understand
the competing raison d’etre of using the states’ coercive power
over society’s dominant mediators of information to the public. In
addressing this challenge, the discussion in this Article suggests a
consensual framework for assessing the political and constitutional
legitimacy of regulating both “old” and “new” media, to which
both utilitarian and rights-based approaches to constitutional rights
are in agreement.
Part I of this Article begins by adopting a socio-legal analysis
to identify and taxonomize the various consensual sources for
legitimizing media law and policy in the last century. Part II turns
to the present and discusses the contemporary problems of judicial
review and free speech jurisprudence with respect to evaluating the
legitimacy or permissibility of media regulation. First, it addresses
the constitutional debate over the permissibility of using the state’s
10

Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
At present, scarcity is an old problem of “old media.” See Schejter & Yemini, supra
note 9, at 243 (framing communication policy through a prism of scarcity is no longer
relevant in the age of broadband internet).
11
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coercive power for the allocative/distributive management of
speech. Second, it addresses the political-moral dispute within
liberalism about the competing values of free speech and media
regulation. Third, it identifies the principle of state neutrality as the
unifying challenge for both political theory and free speech
jurisprudence in evaluating the legitimacy of any public-interest
regulation of private power in the public sphere. Part III proceeds
to suggest a consensual framework for assessing the legitimacy of
typical regulatory duties over the media by developing the primary
conditions for political and constitutional legitimacy: (1)
rationality (the factual question of the necessity; requirement for
social facts); and (2) proportionality between the relative weight of
the competing values that both media regulation and free speech
jurisprudence share: liberty, equality, and diversity.12
I. THE COMPETING JUSTIFICATIONS OF COMMUNICATION LAW &
POLICY: TAXONOMY AND APPLICABILITY
The political and legal reasoning about media regulation and its
desirability were formulated during the twentieth century with
regard to broadcast media as the emerging communicative
technology of the time.13 Although the broadcast medium plays a
very limited role in today’s information age, the discussion in this
Section suggests that the primary rationales for public-interest
regulation of broadcast can be applied to new communicative
technologies as a matter of principle. By adopting socio-historic
analysis as a legal realism approach,14 this Section offers a
taxonomy of the various reasons and rationales for regulating

12
For a discussion of the consensual value of diversity in media law and policy, see
infra Section III.C.
13
See 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 6, § 1:10.
14
Socio-historical analysis, as a branch of legal realism, focuses on the work of
society’s coercive normative institutions and avoids the normativity impulse of common
legal scholarship. See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 671, 675 (2010) (Socio-historical analysis considers law to be a subject
matter or a field of inquiry distinct from traditional legal science, while suspending direct
normative evaluation of law and public policy).
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media and communicative technologies in the name of the public
interest.
Section A of this Part begins by presenting the moral and
practical importance of “the public interest” concept, as the
guiding framework of both policy-making and legal reasoning
about media law and policy. The next Sections of this Part (B–D)
taxonomize the competing approaches to the meaning of the public
interest in the context of media regulation, and, respectively, the
competing theories of justice and legitimacy that have guided and
still guide media regulation and its judicial review.
A. The Importance and Ambiguity of “The Public Interest” in
Communication Law and Policy
The concept of “the public interest” plays an essential role in
the political and legal justifications of mass-media regulation.15
The public interest framework had key importance during the
twentieth century, both as the common source to justify media
regulation and as the standard for evaluating such regulation’s
efficiency, desirability, or, more generally, its legitimacy.
Moreover, it continues to be the guiding standard of contemporary
media law and policy.16
The “public interest” stands for the principle that the special
interests of the public (or of society) regarding the media serve as
the primary source for legitimizing coercive regulation over it. As
McQuail elaborated:
The public interest expresses the idea that
expectations from, and claims against, the mass
media on the grounds of the wider and longer-term
good of society—can be legitimately expressed and

15

See MIKE FEINTUCK & MIKE VARNEY, MEDIA REGULATION, PUBLIC INTEREST AND
THE LAW 74–77 (2d ed. 2013) (regarding the United Kingdom and the European Union);
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 9, at 13 (regarding the United States).
16
Currently, public-interest regulation of online content providers has been adopted in
Europe since 2010 by the AVMSD, which stipulates technology-neutral regulation of
audiovisual media, guided by the principle of “the public interest.”
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may lead to constraints on the structure or activity
of media.
The content of what is “in the public interest” takes
various forms. Its most minimal interpretation is
that the media should meet the needs of their
audiences, but ethical, ideological, political and
legal considerations may also lead to much stronger
definitions.17
Before beginning to reason about the actual content of the
public interest with regard to the media, it is important to
understand the moral and political significance of this term, as it is
the primary political reason or constitutional justification for
imposing public duties over private-commercial media services.18
As the literature suggests, it is possible to identify three
competing perceptions of what constitutes the content of the public
interest in the context of public policy19: (1) the “Preponderance
Theory,” which identifies the public interest with the preferences
of the majority in a political community (to wit, the public interest
is “what the public wants”); (2) the “Common Interest Theory,” by
which the public interest is composed of any interest that all
members of the political community are presumed to share in
common (such as the interest in utilities or policing), with little
room for dispute or negotiation about individuals’ actual
preferences; and (3) the “Unitary Theory,” which defines the
public interest on the basis of a normative theory or wide ideology
about what the public needs, absent sensitivity to popular
preferences. With regard to media law and policy, the literature
identifies the rationales underlying media regulation in the
twentieth century as guided mostly by unitary theory, hence
17

See DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 568 (6th ed.
2010) [hereinafter MCQUAIL-2010].
18
Of course, regulation of private or commercial activity in the name of the public
interest is not unique to media law and policy. As Feintuck & Varney identified, much
regulatory activity—not only of the media, but also of utilities—is usually justified in
terms of the public interest. FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 74.
19
This classification is based on Denis McQuail, Media Performance: Mass
Communication and the Public Interest 23–25 (1992) [hereinafter McQuail-1992].
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described as having a “frequently authoritarian, paternalistic or
ideologically contestable character.”20
However, the clearest lesson from the century-long experience
of media regulation is that the public interest concept with regard
to media regulation is highly vague; therefore, it is of little use to
evaluate whether a specific law or policy meets this indefinite
standard. Even after almost a century of experience, the
contemporary literature suggests that, in the context of media
regulation, the public interest standard remained highly vague and
contested, as “the rationales for regulation (‘why regulate?’) and
the objectives of regulation (‘with what end in mind?’) have been
insufficiently addressed.”21 Despite the various theoretical attempts
to define the public interest in the context of old or new media, this
term remains “both vague and contentious.”22
As elaborated upon in the next sections, the various, oftencompeting views of what constitutes the public interest in the
media—which were conceived of with regard to the media
regulation in the twentieth century—are still the source of
contemporary tensions and conflicts about desired policies and
their legitimacy. The following sections reveal that the vagueness
of the public interest term as the guiding standard for evaluating
the legitimacy or desirability of media regulation over the last
century does not stem from lack of ideas about the meaning of the
term, but rather from the plurality of competing understandings of
what it implies.
B. The Utilitarian / Market-Based Justification: Giving the Public
What It Wants
When we perceive the public interest as “giving the public
what it wants,” the reason for using the state’s coercive power over
any private-commercial activity is grounded in the utilitarian
principle of satisfying preferences or optimizing social welfare.
20

Id. at 25.
Id. at 5.
22
Id. at 75 (“[E]ven when attempts have been made to define the concept, they tend to
incorporate rather than resolve tensions between competing versions of it.”).
21
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This utilitarian, market-based approach to justice in
communication law and policy can be identified (and distinguished
from Rawlsian distributive justice) by these three principles23: (a)
the utilitarian approach is goal-oriented, rather than rights-based;
(b) the utilitarian approach focuses on maximizing the general
welfare, rather than on the way the benefits of the media are
distributed; and (c) the utilitarian approach may justify and require
favoring the few at the expense of the many, in the name of the
common good.24
Within this economic-utilitarian framework, the legitimacy of a
specific regulatory rule or policy is mostly an empirical matter, in
the sense that this approach offers no normative prescription of
“the good life” or valuations regarding media outputs. Instead, the
economic-utilitarian approach considers the aim of regulation to
involve fulfilling individual preferences and maximizing social
welfare through an efficient allocation of resources.
This reasoning regarding media law and policy is often
categorized as the “economic justifications” for media regulation.
In essence, this classic utilitarian-economic rationale for media
regulation is that unregulated media markets exhibit strong
tendencies to succumb into oligopolistic patterns.25 Consequently,
unregulated media markets are limited in their ability to supply
their audience with what it wants.26 Thus, utilitarian arguments for
using the state’s power to regulate media ownership and content
comprise a private case of the familiar classic/neo liberal

23

Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 142–43.
Id.
25
FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 97.
26
C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (W. Lance Bennett & Robert
M. Entman eds., 2001) (justifying media regulation by identifying the structural limits of
media markets with serving the public interest in terms of ‘giving people what they
want.’); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1997); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1666 (1967) (justifying media regulation by showing how the market of
mass media tend towards concentration, which in turn limits the diversity and vibrancy of
their outputs).
24
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justification for markets regulation27: correcting market failures
that limit the ability of a free market to optimize social welfare.
“Regulation in such cases is argued to be justified because the
uncontrolled marketplace will, for some reason, fail to produce
behavior or results in accordance with the public interest.”28
In its basic meaning, market failure is identified by economic
parameters, such as monopolies, market share, or externalities—
which lead to inefficient competitions or incentives in designated
markets.29 Within this framework, the economic justifications for
media regulation take root in the notion that media outputs, as
commercial products, may not be distributed efficiently without
market regulations.30 That is, the underlying assumptions about the
ability of free markets to supply people with what they want do not
apply so well to media products.31 As such, the utilitarianeconomic justification for media regulation is highlyconsequential, as the legitimacy of using the state’s coercive
powers depends on a straightforward utilitarian notion of
comparing the consequences of regulation to those of its absence
(regarding the goal of maximizing utility and individual
preferences).
In the constitutional domain, the utilitarian reason has
comprised the basis for adopting the freedom of speech into
American jurisprudence and the “marketplace of ideas” concept as

27

See, e.g., Reeve T. Bull, Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing on EU Insights to
Rationalize U.S. Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2015).
28
ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION:
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 15 (2d ed. 2012).
29
Id.
30
BAKER, supra note 26, at 7–14.
31
BAKER, supra note 26, at 8–13 (explaining the ability of markets to efficiently
supply people with what they want, is based on two primary assumptions: (1) products
are sold in competitive markets at a price close to their marginal cost; (2) the production
and consumption of the product does not involve significant externalities on third parties.
In this regard, Baker showed that media products have unique features vis-à-vis regular
products: media have significant ‘public good’ aspects, at least with regard to broadcast
and other payment-free media services. Moreover, with both ‘free’ and pay-based
commercial media, the marginal cost of serving an additional consumer predictably will
be substantially less than the average cost).
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the dominant reason in judicial review of media regulation in the
twentieth century.32
Moreover, the economical-utilitarian approach to the public
interest—and to justice in general—not only justifies the existing
regulation of traditional media but can generally be applied to the
commercial media of the twenty-first century. That is, present
commercial mass-media, such as Facebook and YouTube, have
similar economic characteristics that are inconsistent with the
classical assumption about the ability of unregulated markets in
supplying people with what they want. First, contemporary
technologies of mass-media—as was with the twentieth century
media and media markets—are trending toward concentration and
consolidations, due to the medium-natural effects of size in content
production and distribution.33 Second, as was the case in the
twentieth century, contemporary content platforms operate within
two-sided market conditions, whereby profits are not derived from
users, but rather from advertisers (to which the media sell
advertising slots) or third parties (to which the new media sells
information about the users).34 Third, since both traditional and
new media are the primary mediators of information and politics,

32
See Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 143, for a discussion about the utilitarian
nature of American free speech jurisprudence.
33
See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004); Guy Rolnik,
Digital Platforms and Concentrations, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. (2018), https://
promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Digital-Platforms-and-Concentration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SNM3-7DBV].
34
Within the utilitarian-economic justification for broadcast regulation, the character
of media markets as two-sided markets means that the media’s revenues derived from
advertisers and not directly from their audiences. Hence, those conditions inherently limit
the ability of unregulated content platforms to maximize their consumers’ preferences.
See BAKER, supra note 26, at 11 (“advertisers in effect pay the media firm to gain an
audience by providing the audience with something that audience wants, although not
necessarily what the audience most want”); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public
Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 514 (2000) (“television is not an ordinary product, for
broadcasters do not sell programming to viewers in return to cash . . . this phenomenon
introduces some serious distortion, at least if we understand an ideal broadcasting market
as one in which viewers receive what they want.”).
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their products have significant positive and negative social
externalities,35 which the media do not internalize.
Pointing to those economic similarities between broadcasting
and contemporary mediators of speech does not aim to suggest that
they are identical, or that they should be economically regulated in
a same manner.36 They serve to support a more-modest argument:
those who adopt the utilitarian/economic approach to justice
should not consider regulation of both new and old media as
categorically impermissible. As the discussion in this Section
illustrated, the utilitarian/economic justification for media
regulation may legitimize regulation of the “new mediators” by
asserting its necessity and proportionality.37
C. Harm-Based Justification: Mass-Communication Technologies
as a Social Risk
In any version of liberal democracy, individuals are morally
and legally obliged not to harm other individuals. Thus, the state
may prohibit or limit harmful activity, and the legitimacy of such
state actions depends on the liberal harm principle: “[t]he only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.”38
As a descriptive argument, consensus exists that, during the
twentieth century, commercial media were perceived as possessing
significant ability to harm individuals or society at large.39 This
35

BAKER, supra note 26, at 10 ("Media products often produce extraordinary
significant positive and negative externalities. Externalities typically refer to the value
some item has to someone who does not participate in the transaction").
36
See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, BUFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (describing today’s digital capitalism, in which people pay for
information though digital surveillance and exploiting personal data of their audiences, as
economically different than the twentieth century’s media).
37
For discussion about the conditions of rationality and proportionality in this context,
see infra Part III.
38
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859).
39
See, e.g., FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 5 (describing the democratic
justification for media regulation as power-based, whereby those who exercise either
governmental or private power legitimately have their powers limited, guided by the
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public notion of the media posing a severe risk to the wellness of
individuals and society naturally called for regulation in order to
protect the wellbeing of media audiences.
This harm-based justification of media regulation is no less
potent regarding new media today than it was historically with
regard to broadcasted media. In debating the need to regulate
YouTube or Facebook, we should acknowledge that the liberal
harm principle was and still is the primary source of political
legitimacy for any suppressive content duties on the media,
comprising a particular use of the state’s restrictive powers. A
notable example is the question of regulating “fake new” on social
media. Contemporary calls to use the state’s coercive power to
suppress or limit this kind of content rely on the consensual harm
principle, as it focuses on the harmful consequence of this
content.40
To understand the important role of the harm principle in
media regulation and free speech jurisprudence, consider the
medium-dependent regulation of indecencies as an example of the
risk-based reason for regulating the media (and for diminishing the
media’s constitutional protection against governmental regulation).
The prohibitions or limitations on indecencies make a good test
case for illustrating the harm-based rationale of media regulation,

democratic principle of decentralization social power; thus, given the broad extent of
power that the media exercise as dominant mediators of information, politics, and culture,
they must be regulated to prevent their unique potential to induce individual and social
harms); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 9, at 221–24 (identifying the rationale of
protecting individuals and society from the unique pervasive power of the media as the
main political and constitutional justification for denying full First Amendment
Protection to the 20th century media); see also, MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 564
(identifying the unique social concerns with regards to the electronic media of the 20th
century as irrational or unfounded mass anxiety and concern about the media’s harmful
effects on individual behavior and social order).
40
See, e.g., Adam Kucharski, Post-Truth: Study Epidemiology of Fake News, 540
NATURE 525 (2016) (harm-based call for state intervention by identifying fake news as a
matter of social risk that must be regulated to protect society against its harmful
consequences).
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since they stipulate negative content duties for the media,41 which
are considered to be protected speech elsewhere.
The robust American debate over the legitimacy of regulatory
limitations on indecencies reveals the liberal harm principle as
guiding both the governmental policy and its judicial review. One
of the most notable examples of the harm principle’s application
with regard to medium-specific suppression of indecent content is
the case of Pacifica Found, in which the Supreme Court
demonstrated the harm-based rationale for both regulating the
media and limiting their constitutional protection under the First
Amendment:
[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans . . .
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning
in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect
the listener or viewer from unexpected program
content. To say that one may avoid further offense
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an
assault is to run away after the first blow.42
The constitutional outcome of this harm-principle reasoning,
besides upholding the regulatory rules in this case, is the Court’s
general position that, “[o]f all forms of communication,
broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment protection”
due to its unique potential to harm its audiences.43
A more contemporary example of the harm principle as a
potential source of legitimizing negative content duties regarding
indecencies is the ongoing attempt to regulate indecencies over the

41

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both”).
42
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
43
Id. at 728; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 743 (1996). Courts’ willingness to uphold statutory provisions designed to screen
children from indecent programming continued later with regard to cable television. See
infra note 50.
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internet. The Communication Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)44
comprised the first notable attempt to regulate indecencies or
pornography on the ground of preventing harm to viewers and
third parties that would be affected by the viewers’ beliefs or
behavior.45 The Supreme Court struck down this use of the state’s
coercive power in the case of Reno v. ACLU.46 As a direct
response, the US Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act
of 1998 (COPA),47 with the aim of restricting minors’ access to
harmful materials. Once again, the courts struck down COPA, as
an unjustified violation of the First Amendment.48
Despite the different constitutional treatment of indecency
regulation over broadcast and the Internet, the reasoning remains
the same: negative content-duties (censorship or suppression of
speech) with regard to (any) mass media may be legitimate in
preventing harmful consequences of unregulated access to harmful
content.49 In the context of regulating indecencies over the
44

47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012).
See generally, Lili Levi, The FCC’s Regulation of Indecency, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER, First Reports Vol. 7, No. 1 (Apr. 2008) https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FirstReport.Indecency.Levi_.final_.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/BS8F-ZHRS].
46
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
47
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2012).
48
In Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction on
enforcement of COPA, ruling that the law was likely to be unconstitutional. 535 U.S. 564
(2002). The Court later referred the case back to the district court for a trial. 564 U.S. at
656. In 2007, the district court struck down COPA, finding the law facially in violation of
the First and Fifth Amendments. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d
775 (E.D. Pa. 2007), cert. denied, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009).
49
For an elaborate discussion of indecency regulation in broadcast, cable, and new
media on the grounds of these medias’ unique pervasive and harmful nature, see Matthew
Bloom, Pervasive New Media: Indecency Regulation and the End of the Distinction
Between Broadcast Technology and Subscription-Based Media, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 109
(2006). For more on the Supreme Court’s consistent tendency to strike-down regulatory
rules that sought to limit indecencies on cable television and on the Internet, on the
grounds of violating the First Amendment, see Joel Timmer, The Seven Dirty Words You
Can Say on Cable and DBS, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 179 (2010) (about cable and satellite
television); Emily Vander Wilt, Considering COPA, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373
(2004) (about the internet); Christopher M. Kelly, Spectre of a Wired Nation: Denver
Area Educational Telecommunication Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis
in Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 559 (1997) (comparing the Supreme Court
45
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Internet, the Court reasoned that the legitimacy of such regulation
depends on the questions of necessity and proportionality,50 while
approving the fundamental reasoning of the harm principle as a
consensual justification for media and content regulation.51
The use of the classic harm principle to justify suppressive
content duties is not limited to indecencies, of course. During most
of the twentieth century, broad public and governmental anxiety
surrounded the unique harmful effects of the media and their
content on individuals and society.52 The magnitude of risk and
potential harms that are associated with mass-communicative
technologies often legitimizes broader content regulation (and,
therefore, limited constitutional protections), in order to restrain
the media’s unique power to harm individuals and society at
large.53 As the twentieth century’s media were perceived as a
tremendous social risk, it was considered legitimate to force
special content limitations on various of allegedly harmful media
content, such as violence, drug use, and other anti-social
depictions.54

tendency to allow suppression of indecent content on cable television while strikingdown such regulation on internet-based media).
50
In the case of Reno, the Court reasoned (correctly) that as a matter of history,
broadcast media had “‘received the most limited First Amendment protection,’ in large
part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from unexpected program
content,” in contrast to Internet users, who must take “a series of affirmative steps” to
access explicit material. 521 U.S. at 867 (internal citations omitted).
51
See id. at 868.
52
A prime example is the regulation of graphic violence on the 20th century’s media,
based on the reasoning that exposure to such content might cause harmful behavior. For
the question of causality regarding media exposure and harmful behavior of views, see
infra Section III.A.2.
53
In literature, this harm-based rationale is often characterized as ‘Media
accountability.’ This term stands for the idea (and the processes associated with realizing
it) that media can and should be held account for the consequences of their publishing
activities to society in general and/or to other interest that may be affected. MCQUAIL2010, supra note 17, at 562.
54
For the focus of early and contemporary studies on these kinds of “bad” or
“harmful” media content as the basis for regulatory limitations on such content, see W.
JAMES POTTER, MEDIA EFFECTS 35 (2012); Leonard Reinecke & Mary Beth Oliver,
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At present, the harm principle remains a powerful rationale for
content regulation with regard to the dominant mediators of
content in the twenty-first century (namely, Facebook and
YouTube) as it was with respect to television in the twentieth
century. Given the public interest in assuring the accountability of
dominant media and the protection from various harms, the harm
principle should apply to both traditional and new media, as long
as they pose a potential threat to the wellbeing of individuals or
society.55 Thus, content regulation of both old and new commercial
media can be morally and constitutionally justified, but only if
such regulation meets the general conditions of rationality (a
proven risk from the regulated content) and proportionality (the
regulation is narrowly tailored to the harmful content and is
applied to result in the least collateral damage to free speech
values).56
D. The Distributive / Democracy-Based Justification: Giving the
Public What It Needs
The typical “positive” or “prescriptive” regulatory duties that
were imposed on the twentieth century media, such as universal or
accessible service, the fairness doctrine, or the duty to supply
preferred content (news, local content, or children programming),
accomplish something other than satisfying individual preferences
or negating potential harms to individuals’ wellbeing. They coerce
the media to actively use their resources to promote the collective
needs of a democratic society: equality and self-governance, and
not just the value of individual liberty. In the constitutional sphere,
this kind of reasoning underlies the democratic or progressive

Preface, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MEDIA USE AND WELL-BEING (Leonard
Reinecke & Mary Beth Oliver eds., 2017).
55
For example, contemporary calls for content-regulation on social networks and other
content platforms focus on materials which might cause harm to their audience (such as
graphic violence, drug-use or unrealistic body images), or influence their audience to
harm others (such as content supporting terrorism or racism).
56
For a discussion of the importance of rationality and proportionality as conditions
for political and constitutional legitimacy, see infra Part III.
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positions in which state regulation of the media is consistent with,
and may even be required by, the right to free speech.57 Hence, this
distributive or democracy-based justification of both the right to
free speech and media regulation shares an instrumental, valuesoriented conception of the First Amendment.58 In essence, this
democratic-distributive rationale for media regulation perceives the
constitutional right to free speech as justifying (and even requiring)
the state to reallocate speech opportunities to secure the collective
needs of a democratic society.59
This democratic-distributive rationale for media regulation
emerged as a response to the political economy of speech in the
twentieth century,60 in which the (commercial) media and their
markets served the interest of only those who could or were willing
to pay for them.61 The inclusion of egalitarian values within the
public interest approach to media law and policy in the second half
of the twentieth century relied on the “maturation” of classical
liberalism into political liberalism (as a matter of principle), as
well as on the political economy of the media markets (as a matter
of policy).62
This shift in the understanding of the right to free speech as a
source for legitimizing media regulation gained its greatest
prominence in the Red Lion case, during the golden age of mass
57
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783 (1987). For previous
formulation of this democratic-affirmative interpretation of the first amendment, see
Barron, supra note 26; Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of The First
Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795 (1981). For a contemporary formulation of this
democratic reasoning of the First Amendment as an “active liberty” which justifies
regulation and enhances public discourse, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39 (2005).
58
See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at
War with Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2007).
59
See id. at 1217 (“In all cases, the government is intervening in media markets by
redistributing power over the means and content of communication to further First
Amendment speech values.”).
60
See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 514.
61
See id.
62
For a discussion of the joint maturation of liberalism and free speech theory from
utilitarianism to distributive justice and its effect on free speech jurisprudence, see infra
Part II.A.
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media.63 In this landmark case, the Court reasoned that although
broadcast regulation might violate the First Amendment, the
Government could legitimately act to enhance public discourse by
recognizing a “collective right” of the audience to free speech,
which is paramount to that of the media as a speaker.64
In fact, this progressive shift of free speech jurisprudence in the
second half of the twentieth century was a direct result of the
establishment of the electronic mass media as the dominant public
discourse arena. As Balkin suggested:
[I]t is no accident that the progressivist/republican
approach to free speech arose in the twentieth
century, for this was also the century of mass
media. People who endorse democratic theories of
free speech understand that although mass media
can greatly benefit democracy, there is also a
serious potential conflict between mass media and
democratic self-governance. The reason is that mass
media are held by a comparatively few people, and
their ownership gives this relatively small group
enormous power to shape public discourse and
public debate.65
As such, the democratic-distributive justification for using the
state’s coercive power to either suppress or promote different kinds
of speech and speakers rests on three evaluative arguments about
the dangerous consequences of avoiding regulation66: (1) the
people who control mass media (wealthy or powerful individuals)
will skew the coverage of public issues to promote views that they
support; (2) the mass media will omit important information,
issues, and positions that the public should take into account,

63

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). This legal reasoning was
originally formulated about the printed press in Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945).
64
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
65
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2004).
66
Id.
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resulting in exposure to only a limited set of facts or ideas; and (3)
the mass media will reduce the quality of public discourse in the
quest for higher revenues and other profits that come with them,
resulting in over-simplification and “dumbing down” of
discussions on public issues and transforming news and politics
into forms of entertainment and spectacles.
By relying on these factual assumptions, the democratic theory
of free speech, supported by Rawlsian political liberalism, supplies
a powerful counter-reason to the straightforward utilitarian
approach to the public interest in the media. It is not just what the
public wants, but also what democratic self-governance needs.67
Thus, both democratic theory of free speech and Rawlsian
distributive justice share the notion that those who exercise
(political or private) social power should legitimately have their
powers limited, guided by the democratic principle of
decentralization of social power.68
Thus, the democratic-distributive justification for regulating
the twentieth century’s dominant media might be applied to the
new commercial media of the twenty-first century (such as
Facebook and YouTube), as they have replaced the power of

67

As Balkin explains:
[D]emocracy-based theorists of free speech in the twentieth century
have argued that government must regulate the mass media in a
number of different ways: (1) by restricting and preventing media
concentration; (2) by imposing public-interest obligations that require
the broadcast media to include programming that covers public issues
and covers them fairly; and (3) by requiring the broadcast media to
grant access to a more diverse and wide-ranging group of speakers in
order to expand the agenda of public discussion.
Id. at 30–31.
68
See FEINTUCK & VARNEY supra note 15, at 5 (“The centrality of the media to
democracy, as the primary information source, cannot be overemphasized, and the very
fact that democracy requires citizens to be informed if they are to act effectively as
citizens, serves as a prima facie justification for regulation within a democratic
context.”). Thus, the democratic justification for media regulation differs from the
utilitarian reasoning, by rejecting treatment of the media as pure commercial activity.
“Given its essential nature in relation to democracy, the media cannot be treated like a
commodity; the democratic premium on diversity and universal availability means that
these features cannot be left to chance.” Id. at 103.
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television as the dominant commercial mediators of information,
politics, and culture.69 In fact, notable scholars point out that
today’s new media are even more powerful than the “old” media in
their abilities to influence the flow of information and politics to
the public.70 Since the democratic-distributive framework for
communication policy and free speech jurisprudence adopts an
instrumental-collectivist conception of the right to free speech, it is
not limited to broadcast or traditional media.71 This framework
may justify further regulation of new communicative
technologies—in order to secure the speech rights of the public
against the predictable outcomes of concentrations in ownership
over the means to deliver information to the public.72
In concluding this Part, the socio-historic analysis reveals
various sources of political and constitutional legitimacy of media
regulation.73 Alongside the harm principle, the primary sources for
legitimizing media regulation are the competing theories of justice
about media regulation and free speech jurisprudence: the
utilitarian-economic approach (which perceives of media
audiences as consumers) and the democratic-distributive approach
(which regards media audiences as citizens).74 Both of which
tolerate speech regulation in the name of “the public interest,”
69

See Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9 (adopting the democratic-distributive rational
for media regulation in the context of contemporary debates over communication policy
in the era of broadband internet).
70
Balkin, supra note 36; TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS (1st ed. 2016)
(describing the digital media’s unprecedented powers to capture and influence their
audience attention, which was made possible by their new technological abilities to
collect and analyze personal data about their users).
71
See source cited supra note 65.
72
Contemporary calls for addressing information intermediaries (namely, Facebook or
Google) as fiduciaries or public trustees. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment
Obsolete? KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE (Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org
/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete [https://perma.cc/J4XE-LQ9Y] (arguing for
imposing public trustee duties on major speech platforms, in the spirit of Red Lion Case,
in which the Court prioritized the speech rights of the public over the speech rights of the
media. The specific duties that Wu suggests imposing on major speech platforms as
public trustees include “general duties to police fake users, remove propaganda robots,
and promote a robust speech environment surrounding matters of public concern”).
73
See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
74
See FEINTUCK & VERRNEY, supra note 15, at 78; GOODMAN supra note 58, at 1231.
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while emphasizing the undesired results of concentrated control of
communicative resources.75
At present, as was in the second half of the twentieth century,
these two competing theories of justice still inform policy-making
and judicial review.76 The contention between those two theories
of justice is ideological, as both theories take different stands on
the proper relationship between economics and political power, as
well as on the role that the state and the constitutional right to free
speech should play in structuring that relationship.77
II. PRESENT PROBLEMS: EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LEGITIMACY OF NEW MEDIA REGULATION
The discussion in the previous Part demonstrates how both the
utilitarian and the democratic rationales that legitimized the
twentieth century’s media regulation can explain the sources of
contemporary calls for content regulation of new communicative
technologies.78 With that, it also illustrated the fundamental divide
over the social aims that communication law and policy should
promote, or what justice demands with regard to private power and
state authority in the public sphere. The present Part aims to show
how those old questions about justice in media regulation stand at
the core of today’s robust debate over the constitutionality of
regulating new communicative technologies.

75

See sources cited supra note 74.
OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996) (arguing that the liberal tension between
liberty and equality could be described as the familiar unsolved tension between
capitalism and democracy); Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 141 (although the
Rawlsian approach to justice embraces capitalism and the role of markets in fair
regulation, it directly contradicts traditional utilitarianism due to its focus on correcting
the ills of the past before adopting new policies).
77
See supra note 76.
78
See supra Part I. The prominent contemporary example is the moral and
constitutional debate over the constitutional permissibility of imposing new neutrality
rules on ISPs. In this debate, as was with broadcast regulation in the 20th century, it is
divided between market-based theory of justice (which seeks to maximize economic
efficiency) and the democratic-distributive theory of justice. See Schejter & Yemini,
supra note 9.
76
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That said, the discussion here does not take sides on the
ideological divide over the competing theories of justice about
media law and policy. Rather, it shows how the failure to identify,
acknowledge, and address the tension between the competing
reasons and justifications for regulation undermines any attempt to
regulate. To better inform current debates about speech regulation
with regard to new forms of mass communicative technologies,
this Part identifies the theoretical and practical challenges facing
current free speech jurisprudence in ensuring the legitimacy of
government regulation over the media and their content.
A. The Challenges of Political Theory and Free Speech
Jurisprudence: Liberalism Divided
The challenge of present political theory regarding media
regulation and free speech jurisprudence stems from the maturation
of Liberalism during the second half of the twentieth century.79
Until the mid-twentieth century, liberalism was defined almost
exclusively by the principle of protecting individual liberty from
state intrusion.80 The progressive change in liberal thought is
mostly associated with John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971),
which introduced the egalitarian Difference Principle of
redistribution in favor of the worst-off social groups.81 Thus,
equality has become one of the defining goals of progressive or
political liberalism and a legitimate source for the coercive use of
state power.82 Moreover, within this approach of political
liberalism, sometimes individual liberty must be “sacrificed” to
protect disadvantaged groups from unjust subordination, which in
turn protects substantial democratic participation in the public
sphere.83

79

See Schejter & Yemini supra note 9, at 146–54.
FISS, supra note 76, at 4.
81
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harv. U. Press eds., Revised ed. 1999)
(“[t]he primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the
way which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation”).
82
FISS, supra note 76, at 1.
83
Id.
80
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Presently, free speech jurisprudence—as the source of and
constraint on media regulation—is highly divided between
competing versions of liberalism as a political theory.84 This
challenge involves the ongoing conflict between the libertarian and
progressive poles of liberalism, as was notably described by Owen
Fiss at the end of the twentieth century:
Liberals are at war with themselves. For some time,
freedom of speech has held them together, but now
it is a source of division and conflict [ . . . ] this
division within liberalism arises not from its
pluralistic commitments and inability to prioritize
equality and liberty but rather from a dispute over
the very meaning of freedom. What is at issue is
two different ways of understanding liberty.85
The conflict between “two different ways of understating
liberty” in this context can be summarized as follows: should we
understand liberty and constitutional rights as shields to protect
individuals (and thus, prioritize individual freedom over the
collective needs of a free society), or rather, should we understand
liberty and constitutional rights as a source for an allocative use of
state power?86 Respectively, should the constitutional right to free
speech serve individuality (as classic liberalism demands) or
collective needs (as political or progressive liberalism demands)?
Two decades after Fiss’s observation, this liberal divide is still
the primary problem of media law and policy, as exemplified by
the conflicting libertarian and Rawlsian understandings of the right
to free speech as both the barrier and justification for media
regulation. At present, liberalism—as a normative theory for
evaluating the many uses of state power—seems too rich or plural
to offer consensual conditions for evaluating the legitimacy of the
allocative use of state power vis-à-vis speech and the flow of
information in society. In this plurality of reasonable regulatory
aims, the utility-based and rights-based reasons for media
84
85
86

Id.
Id.
Id.
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regulation should be understood as ideological divisions over the
relative importance of liberty and equality—as the core values of
free speech.
In fact, the egalitarian shift in liberalism, as a political theory,
is directly connected to a significant shift in free speech
jurisprudence during the second half of the twentieth century,
namely the democratic theory of free speech.87 At its core, the
democratic theory of free speech examines the proper relationship
of economic and political power in a democratic society and the
role that the constitutional right to free speech might play in
structuring this relationship.88 As discussed above, this line of
reasoning underlies the democratic-distributive justifications of
media regulation as “giving the public what it needs.”89
This shift in the legal understating of the right to free speech is
manifested in progressive legal theories and doctrines that focus on
the unique nature of the right to free speech as a public rather than
individual right.90 Thus, the democratic theory of free speech
suggested that the purpose of free speech (and of media regulation)
is not only individual self-actualization of the speaker (or negative
liberty, which shields speakers from state interference), but also
the preservation of a functioning democracy by ensuring an
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public discourse.91 Thus, it
calls to discard the conservative-liberal skepticism about state
intervention and acknowledges the “irony of free speech”: under
conditions of economic inequality, private power is as much of an

87

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2.
89
See supra Section I.D.
90
This formulation of the right to free speech as an instrument for ensuring the
collective needs of a democratic society was suggested by Lee C. Bollinger, as a notable
founder of the democratic theory of free speech. See Lee C. Bollinger Jr, Freedom of the
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE
L.J. 438, 451 (1983); LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN (1st ed.
2010).
91
See supra note 90.
88
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enemy of free speech as is the state; therefore, the state can be a
friend of freedom and its enemy.92
Through this lens of political theory, we can now understand
how current debates over regulating both old and new media are
divided on an ideological or moral level, between the egalitarian
and libertarian ends of the liberal spectrum. That is, both the
practice and theory of media regulation and free speech are divided
over the relative importance of liberty and equality, as various
models of liberal democracy (such as “the minimal state” or the
“welfare state”).
The lens of political theory reveals that the liberal divide over
what justice demands with regard to the old media is still the
primary challenge for contemporary policy-making and judicial
review regarding media regulation. That is because the traditional
rationales for media regulation seem to fit much of today’s
commercial mass-communicative technologies. Moreover, the
same rationales for either regulation or diminishing the
constitutional status of broadcast television seem to apply to any
powerful, commercial, profit-driven medium.93 The focus of
regulation may have shifted from CBS to Facebook or YouTube
(as today’s dominant commercial media), but the ideological
divide between utilitarian and distributive perceptions of justice
remains the most significant challenge to media regulation
specifically. Moreover, the libertarian-egalitarian divide is the

92
OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1998). For similar contemporary arguments
which identifies the private power of dominant speech intermediaries (such as Facebook
or Google) as the gravest threat of free speech in our current digital age, see, e.g., Balkin,
supra note 5; Wu, supra note 72.
93
For the democratic reason for media regulation as based on the commercial nature of
the dominant mass-media (rather than on their delivery methods), see FEINTUCK &
VARNEY, supra note 15, at 246 (“[i]t will be necessary to regulate the new media just as
much as the old if the potential benefits are to be reaped and the blight of domination by
commercial interests avoided”). See also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer,
Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335, 340 (2017) (describing the
democratic/progressive theory of free speech as soft-Marxist, since it justifies media
regulation and lesser constitutional protection based on their commercial, profit-driven
nature). Thus, the democratic reason should apply to any dominant profit-driven media
outlet—be it Time Warner, Netflix, or Facebook.
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most significant challenge of free speech theory and doctrine.94
Thus, the question about the necessity or permissibility of today’s
dominant commercial media depends on one’s ideological position
about the relative importance of liberty and equality as the two
competing values of liberal democracy.95
B. The Practical Challenge of Judicial Review: Reaching
Consensus on Affirmative/Distributive Regulation
Communication policy consists of regulatory interventions
specifically designed to promote communicative opportunities by
allocating speech opportunities from communications proprieties.96
The legal arena in which the discussion about the legitimacy of
both “old” and “new” media regulation takes place is the realm of
public law; and, specifically, the right to free speech as a political
principle and as a constitutional right. In this constitutional arena,
the main function of public law and judicial review should be
understood as instruments for ensuring the legal permissibility of
the many uses of state power. From this instrumental perspective,
public law and judicial review supply our political society with
ideas and doctrines to evaluate whether a specific use of the state’s

94
For contemporary positions that support the libertarian or counter-majoritarian
reasoning for the right to free speech, see Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 555 (1991);
Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 93, at 340. For contemporary positions that criticize
the libertarian use of the First Amendment as the right of powerful corporates to evade
public-interest regulation and calls for a participatory-distributive understanding of free
speech as a public right, see Sunstein, supra note 34; Tim Wu, The Right to Evade
Regulation, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 6, 2003); Julie Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119 (2015). For the positive argument by which the Supreme
Court in the last decades continually adopted the libertarian understating for the First
Amendment see Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the
Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition,” 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (2017).
95
For a discussion of the contemporary divide between the values of liberty and
equality in First Amendment jurisprudence see Jeremy K. Kessler & David Pozen, The
Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV 1953, 1953–60 (arguing
that there exists an inegalitarian tendency within First Amendment jurisprudence, which
has become more pronounced during the Roberts Court era).
96
Goodman, supra note 58, at 1211.
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coercive power is justified, and hence constitutionally
permissible.97
In the constitutional sphere, the tension between classic and
progressive conceptions of liberalism is manifested by the question
of whether the use of state power over the media should be viewed
as violating the constitutional right to free speech, or as advancing
it. Specifically, this tension raises a fundamental question about the
social function of the right to free speech: is it an individual right
(that shields speakers against governmental interference) or a
public right (that justifies or necessitates active governmental
actions to ensure)?
At present, after the egalitarian shift of political liberalism, the
right to free speech is “at war with itself.”98 It seems consensual
that using state coercive powers to pursue allocative ends should
not be regarded categorically as unconstitutional (or unjust). With
that, the movement from suppressive/negative state actions to an
affirmative use of state power created new challenges for both
political theory and free speech jurisprudence. Namely, we agree
that the affirmative use of state power may be permissible under
some conditions, but we are having great difficulty in specifying
those particular conditions. Put simply: when the state acts
affirmatively, there is no consensual standard for judicial review to
evaluate the legitimacy of positive content duties.99
Hence, the practical problem of the contemporary legal
reasoning about the constitutional legitimacy of media regulation is
that the foundations of public law and judicial review are rooted in
the classical liberal framework of individual/negative rights. As
such, they were structured to protect the rights and interest of
individuals from illegitimate use of state power. When the state
97

For a similar instrumental approach to the theory and doctrines of the First
Amendment supplying the means, vocabulary, and structural basis for evaluating the
legitimacy of speech regulation, see Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U.
L. Rev. 1, 7 (2016).
98
Id.
99
For the theoretical and doctrinal limitation in evaluating the political and
constitutional legitimacy of an affirmative use of the right to free speech, see FISS, supra
note 76, at 21.
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acts as a censor or stipulates negative content duties, the political
and constitutional legitimacy is evaluated by the familiar harm
principle.100 However, when the state acts affirmatively, no
consensual standard of review exists, despite the broad agreement
that such action is not categorically wrong or unconstitutional.101
This leads to the practical problem of evaluating the legitimacy of
public-interest media regulation, which is done with the concept of
“interests” or “values,” instead of individual rights, on which
constitutional law is traditionally founded. Since First Amendment
doctrine favors right over values and negative liberties over
positive ones,102 it is limited in its instrumental capacity to guide
judicial reasoning over the legitimacy of media regulation.
C. State Neutrality as the Unifying Challenge of Political Theory
and Free Speech Jurisprudence
At present, the challenges of political theory and free speech
jurisprudence with regard to communication policy stem from
reasonable disagreements about the relative importance of free
speech rights versus values, and positive liberties versus negative
liberties. In order to deal with these ideological and practical
challenges, it is crucial to understand how both political theory and
free speech jurisprudence are divided over the principle of state
neutrality as a constraint for any law and policy.
The liberal principle of state neutrality articulates a constraint
on permissible or legitimate state actions, by which the state
should not exercise its coercive powers to promote any specific
version of the “good” unless societal consensus exists in its
regard.103 Thus, both classical liberalism and Rawlsian political
100

See infra Part II.C.
FISS, supra note 76, at 28–31.
102
Goodman, supra note 58, at 1218 (“if a communications proprietors is an editor and
is constrained by a speech regulation, courts will privilege her rights to be free from such
constraint over the values served by the regulation by reviewing skeptically and
regulation that limits her rights in more than an incidental way”). See also id., at 1227–
28.
103
As Wall suggests, there are three common formulations of the state neutrality
constraint on the use of state power: “(1) The state should not promote the good, either
coercively or non-coercively, unless those who are subject to the state’s authority consent
101
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liberalism hold that the state should be neutral among rival
understandings of the good. In contrast, the distributive/democracy
-based justification for free speech and media regulation must
reject the principle of state neutrality, as it stipulates tangible
values that the state should actively promote by application of its
coercive powers.
This question of state neutrality as a constraint on media law
and policy arises with the establishment of the democratic rationale
for media regulation and free speech jurisprudence. Unlike the
market-based utilitarian rationale, the democratic justification for
media regulation offers a value theory about different types of
media content.104 As the socio-historical analysis of the previous
Part reveals, this democratic reason suggests an ideal perception of
the social relations between the media, individuals, and society. As
noted above, this unitary approach to the public interest in the
context of media regulation is defined by a normative theory or
broad ideology about what the public needs, absent any sensitivity
to popular wants.105

to its doing so; (2) The state should not aim to promote the good unless there is a societal
consensus in support of its doing so; (3) The state should not justify what it does by
appealing to conceptions of the good that are subject to reasonable disagreement.” See
Steven Wall, Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 8 (E. Zalta ed., 2017).
104
Of course, Preference Maximization is a value theory. It considers the maximization
of preferences as the ultimate and sole value to be pursued (for critical discussion, see:
THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 118–23 (1998)). With that, the
democratic rational for media regulation offers a more comprehensive value-theory.
According to the democratic rationale for media regulation, the broad impact of a specific
media on society and the fact that some elements of media content might be viewed as
‘merit’ goods (those goods that society, operating through the government, deems to be
especially important or that those in power feel individuals should be encouraged to
consume) often served as primary justifications for positive content duties. (FEINTUCK &
VARNEY, supra note 15, at 117).
105
With regard to media law and policy, the literature identifies the rationale for media
regulation in the 20th century as guided by the unitary theory, and thus described as
“frequently authoritarian, paternalistic or ideoligically contestable character. “ MCQUAIL1992, supra note 19, at 23–25.
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The fundamental aim of the democracy-based justification for
media regulation and free speech—ensuring that a diverse, highquality range of media be made available to all citizens—
incorporates both Rawlsian political liberalism and liberal
perfectionism. The ideal by which citizens should enjoy some
degree of equality of access to critical social goods stands at the
core of Rawlsian political liberalism.106 However, the democracybased justification the right to free speech and of media regulation
takes it one step further: since not all media products (or human
expression) constitute materials that can be identified as a
prerequisite of citizenship, the state must adopt content-based
policies.107
In political theory, the views that a liberal-democratic state
may promote an objective account of the good, thus rejecting state
neutrality as a constraint, are known as perfectionist liberalism.108
Thus, it is possible to identify the difficulty of this dominant
approach, as it stems not only from its paternalism (about an
individual’s wellbeing) but rather from its nature as perfectionist

106

See FISS, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
For this perfectionist-elitist notion of the democracy-based theory of free speech and
media regulation, see, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 138–41 (1991)
(prioritizing the value of education for citizenship over the pleasure of entertainment);
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 528 (describing broadcast television—or ‘the media’—as
supplying low-quality content aimed at the popular tastes of the uneducated); FEINTUCK
& VARNEY, supra note 15, at 17–18 (from the democratic perspective on free speech and
media regulation, entertaining media content is less valuable, and thus, less worthy of
constitutional protection—than informational or educating media content). See also, Jack
M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and The First Amendment, 10 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1055,
1088 (2016) (describing the democratic-progressive theory of free speech as granting
diminished constitutional protection to artistic or entertaining contents, since those are
perceived as lacking social value or real contribution to the democratic process of selfgovernance).
108
“Speaking generally, perfectionist writers advance an objective account of the good
and then develop an account of ethics and/or politics that is informed by this account of
the good. Different perfectionist writers propose different accounts of the good and arrive
at different ethical and political conclusions. But all perfectionists defend an account of
the good that is objective in the sense that it identifies states of affairs, activities, and/or
relationships as good in themselves and not good in virtue of the fact that they are desired
or enjoyed by human beings.” Wall, supra note 103. For the meaning of perfectionism
regarding media law and policy, see Section II.1.
107
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liberalism (about society’s well-being), which rejects the principle
of state neutrality as a constraint on the use of state power.109
Thus, since political perfectionism denies the principle of state
neutrality as a constraint on permissible or legitimate state
action,110 it raises a moral and practical problem for free speech
jurisprudence and judicial review doctrines that are based on the
liberal principle of state neutrality.111 The inherent concern is that
liberal perfectionism is insufficiently sensitive to the harm of
coercion and the values of liberty and individual autonomy.112 In
the context of communication policy and speech regulation in
general, it causes doctrinal problems since the perfectionist aspect
of the distributive/democracy-based justification rejects the use of
free speech rights in favor of free speech values and interest.
Through this lens, we can now see that the unifying problem of
free speech jurisprudence and political theory is that the idea of
state neutrality does not correspond with an affirmative or
allocative use of state power. This concluding argument of the
109

For the contemporary theoretical debate about the similarities and differences
between liberal perfectionism and paternalism, compare Wall, supra note 103 (arguing
that not every kind of state perfectionism are paternalistic, due to the noncoercive
constrain of perfectionist liberalism), with JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT
PERFECTION (2011) (arguing that liberal perfectionism is almost entirely unable to escape
the charge of paternalism).
110
The perfectionist nature of the democracy-based theory of free speech is mostly
associated with its founding father’s famous assertion that “what is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.” See ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (2000).
111
For a moral-legal proposition that rejects perfectionism, claiming the state should be
neutral to rival understanding of the good, see Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE MORALITY 43 (S. Hampshire ed., 1978); CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF
MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
112
Of course, even when acknowledging the harms of coercion and the value of liberty
regulation can be legitimate. For example, liberal perfectionism which recognizes
political autonomy as the foundation of any further liberty and lack of coercion, might
argue that advancing liberty must be done through a guarantee that all can effectively
participate in politics. With that, in the context of media law and policy both policy
makers and judicial review fail to acknowledge the harms of regulation to the public
interest, rather than its harms to the regulated individual. For a discussion of the hidden
tradeoffs of liberty, equality and diversity in the context of media regulation, see infra
Section III.C.
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current Section is mostly descriptive, as it does not “take sides” in
the clash between political liberalism and liberal perfectionism,
which are both reasonably acceptable. Instead, the analysis that
this Section posits suggest that we should understand the familiar
tensions
of
liberty/equality,
consumer/citizen,
and
individualism/collectivism, vis-à-vis media law and policy, as
different framings of the same divide.
When regulation rejects the state neutrality principle by
defining preferred content that should be protected in the name of
the public interest, it must adopt some degree of liberal
perfectionism in prescribing the “good life” that the regulation
seeks to bring into existence. The unifying problem then comprises
the concern that the democratic-distributive justifications for free
speech and media regulation may be insufficiently sensitive to the
potential social harm of governmental control over the media, and
to the counter-majoritarian reasoning of the right to free speech.
In response to those theoretical and practical challenges, the
next Part suggests a consensual framework for evaluating the
political and constitutional legitimacy of media law and policy
while bridging the ideological-moral gap between the libertarian
and distributive poles of the liberal-democratic spectrum.
III. CONSENSUAL CONDITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ANY
MEDIA REGULATION
In recent literature, scholars are united in observing that
reasoning about speech regulation in our age of information must
develop finer methods of First Amendment review.113 As the
previous Part illustrated, this is especially true in the context of
“old” and “new” media regulation. Both the market-based and
113

See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 58, at 1250–61 (“[A] more flexible and contextsensitive approach to media policy review promises to be more hospitable to the full
ranges of speech interest implicated by government interventions in media markets”);
Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65
EMORY L. J. 495, 530 (2015) (arguing that current First Amendment doctrine, which
adopts a categorical method of evaluation is inadequate for analyzing the complex
problems involved in constitutional jurisprudence).
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democracy-based approaches may accept speech regulation in the
name of the public interest. They are both united in the
consequentialist-instrumental perceptions of free speech and media
policy. However, they are highly divided about the conditions or
method to evaluate the legitimacy of speech regulation in the name
of the public interest.
This Part offers both policymakers and jurists three guiding
principles for reasoning about the constitutional permissibility of
regulating “old” and “new” media alike. Section III.A suggests
how judicial review can avoid the ideological choice between the
competing theories of justice by adopting the concept of political
legitimacy. The next two Sections further develop the consensual
conditions for such legitimacy: rationality (in Section III.B) and
proportionality (in Section III.C).
A. Bridging the Ideological Divide: From Justice to Political
Legitimacy
Alongside the foundational differences between the competing
rationales of media regulation, it is essential to bear in mind that
utilitarianism and Rawlsian liberalism are not necessarily rivals.114
In fact, both utilitarianism and Rawlsian political liberalism
emphasize the importance of freedom of expression as a political
principle and as a constitutional right.115

114

For example, the regulation of primary goods such as water or electricity can be
justified both by utilitarianism and political liberalism. The former approach would
justify the use of regulatory power by a cost/benefit analysis of the alternatives and
suggest that it would be much more efficient that the state manage these natural
monopolies. This approach would stress the moral duty of the state to equally supply its
citizens equally with primary goods, which they have a right to that is not (entirely)
dependent on the ability to pay. See David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (E. Zalta ed., 2018).
115
For the importance of ensuring fundamental rights, and especially the right to free
speech within utilitarian philosophy, see Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 143
(explaining that the root of the “marketplace of ideas” concept traces back to Mill’s
utilitarian philosophy, as does the concept of social responsibility of the press). For the
Rawlsian support of the right to free speech as a ‘primary good’, see RAWLS, supra note
111, at 358.
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With that, the potential solutions to contemporary dilemmas,
such as the legitimacy of net-neutrality rules, of content regulation
on digital platforms, and of the protected status of media
corporations, are still highly contested on the political-ideological
sphere.116 As the previous Part showed, these conflicts and
tensions between the utility-based and rights-based approaches to
the legitimacy of speech regulation might not be neatly resolved,
since they offer competing and reasonable stands (or ideologies)
about the relative importance of individual liberty and collective
needs of society.117
To help resolve the ideological divide between the competing
theories of justice with regard to media law and policy, this Part
suggests that judicial review over speech-related regulation should
evaluate the political legitimacy of the regulatory act (is the state
act constitutionally permissible?), rather than choose between
competing notions of justice (what is the right thing for the state to
do?).
In political theory, the common definition of “political
legitimacy” is a virtue of political institutions and of laws and
policies, which refers to some benchmark of acceptability or
justification of coercive political power.118 This normative concept
of political legitimacy is often equated with justice, since justice
and legitimacy commonly draw on the same set of political
values.119 Thus, the main problem that a conception of legitimacy

116
See Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 141–46 (addressing the legitimacy of netneutrality rules as contested between utilitarian and distributive theories of justice); see
also Kessler & Pozen, supra note 95, at 1987 (addressing the legitimacy of regulating
social media platforms as contested between libertarian and egalitarian ideologies).
117
See supra Part II.
118
Peter Fabienne, Political Legitimacy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2017 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ (last visited Nov.
29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5YP3-US9H]; Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32
PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 2 (2004).
119
Rawls considers political legitimacy and justice to be related—but not identical—as
they occupy different moral domains; thus, legitimacy makes weaker demands than
justice. RAWLS-1993, supra note 111, at 225. This interpretation of Rawls is based on
Wall. See generally Wall, supra note 103.
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aims to solve is how to distinguish the rightful use of political
power from unjust coercion.
The problem of distinguishing the rightful use of political
power from mere coercion is precisely the instrumental function of
public law and of judicial review. Hence, whether we equate
political legitimacy with justice or see it as a different form of
morality, we can use the concept of political legitimacy as a
justification of political authority.120 Through this framework, we
can think of public law and judicial review as instruments for
securing the political legitimacy of various state actions. When we
ask if a specific rule or regulation is constitutionally permissible,
we actually inquire into its political legitimacy. In this respect,
judicial review over state actions utilizes doctrinal tests for
evaluating the political legitimacy (i.e., the constitutionality) of the
state’s use of its coercive powers and supplies different remedies in
case use of state power is found to be illegitimate.
Adopting this instrumental concept of political legitimacy
enables us to bridge political morality and public law—where the
latter is our legal instrument for evaluating and enforcing the
political legitimacy of governmental actions. In both political
theory and public law, this criterion of legitimacy is negative: it
offers an account of when effective authority ceases to be
legitimate.121
Therefore, both policymakers and judicial review should use
the normative concept of political legitimacy as a consensual
framework for evaluating the coercive political authority that is
exercised on the various forms of media in the twenty-first century,
such as regulatory institutions and regulatory rules (set by either
120

Joseph Raz links legitimacy to the justification of political authority by arguing that
political authority is just a special case of the more general concept of authority. For this
interpretation of Raz, see Fabienne, supra note 118. Alternately, the relations between
legitimacy and the creation of authority may be understood as follows: the attempt to rule
without legitimacy is an attempt to exercise coercive power, not authority. Such a view is
associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who defines legitimacy as justification for the
state’s exercise of coercive power and as creating an obligation to obey. See JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1988) (1762).
121
Fabienne, supra note 118.
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legislation or administrative actions). Hence, an understanding of
the consensual liberal-democratic conditions for political
legitimacy is necessary for evaluating the existing regulatory
practices affecting various media (including broadcast, cable, and
satellite television) and structuring public policy about yetunregulated media (such as Netflix, Google, and Facebook).
In addressing the contemporary problems of free speech
jurisprudence discussed in Part II, the next Sections of this Part
identify and develop the two consensual conditions for legitimacy,
be they justified on the basis of securing individual liberty and
autonomy, or on the basis of pursuing collective-social interests
and needs: (a) rationality (the demand for social facts) and (b)
proportionality (between the core values of both media regulation
and free speech jurisprudence: individual liberty, equality, and
diversity).122
B. Rationality: Reviewing the Factual Arguments of Both
Utilitarian and Democracy-Based Justifications of Media
Regulation
1. Different Regulatory Rules Require Different Justifications
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the conflict
between the state and free speech was manifested in suppression
and prohibitions of the mass-media; throughout the twentieth
century, it was reshaped into permission and then a prescription.123
Due to the many possible uses of state powers with regard to mass
communicative technologies, this Section argues that suppressions
of and prohibitions on the media and their content rely on a
different rationale than regulatory duties of prescription. Hence,
the principle of rationality demands that each regulatory duty must
be evaluated by its own reasoning.

122

See generally Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9.
See MCQUAIL-1992, supra note 19, at 9 (tracing the conflict between state authority
and media freedom through the early stages of suppression and prohibition (regarding the
press), to permission, and then prescription (regarding regulation of audio-visual
services)).
123
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To understand the different justifications that different media
regulation rationales require, it is helpful to sketch a general
taxonomy of the typical practices of state coercive power in the
context of media regulation, alongside the distinct reasons that
legitimize those typical regulatory duties:
TABLE 1. TYPICAL REGULATORY DUTIES AND THEIR
JUSTIFICATION

Structural
/
Content-Neutral
Regulation

Negative
Content Duties
(suppression
/prohibition)

Regulatory
Duty
License
regime

Grounds
for
justification
Scarcity,
collective action
problem

Universal
service

Media services
as primary goods
(or utilities)
The harm and
precautionary
principles
(assuming that
exposure to this
content affects
attitudes and
behavior)
The harm and
precautionary
principles

Limiting
Indecencies
or graphic
violence

Limiting 'fake
news'

Positive Content
Duties
(prescription)

124

The fairness
doctrine

The importance
of media to
collective selfgovernment

Subsidies and
positive
content duties
(local culture,
educational
or highgenres)

The importance
of media
diversity for
individual and
collective
flourishing

Regulatory
objectives
Efficient use of the
electromagnetic
spectrum for
broadcast
More egalitarian
distribution of
critical resources
Negating the
intrusive power of
the media over their
viewers as captive
audiences

Political morality or
values served
Utilitarianism

Negating the harms
of disinformation to
political-democratic
participation
Equal access and
participation in an
uninhibited, robust,
and accessible
public debate on
public issues
Promoting diversity
or quality of media
outputs.124

"Democratic Harm
Principle" (protecting
public discourse)

Political/progressive
liberalism (equality)
Classical liberalism
(individual liberty and
autonomy)

Political/progressive
liberalism (equality)
The value of
pluralism/diversity
The values of
pluralism and moral
perfectionism125

For the importance of diversity as a post-liberal addition to the values of
liberty and equality, see infra Part III.C.1.
125
As elaborated in the previous Part, the term of ‘perfectionism’ in moral and
legal philosophy is usually contrasted with utilitarianism or political liberalism,
since perfectionist liberalism rejects the principle of state neutrality as the basic
constraint over the use of state power. See supra Part II.
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This table does not offer a full description of the many uses of
state power in relation to the media or speech regulation in general.
Nevertheless, it allows us to identify the specific rationale(s) for
justifying typical uses of state power with regard to the media.
When the state uses its powers for prohibition or suppression of
speech or speakers (negative content duties), a consensual standard
exists for evaluating its political or constitutional legitimacy: the
harm principle from classical liberalism.126 Such duties (as a
violation of free speech rights) are usually founded on the state’s
responsibility to protect the well-being of individuals or society
from potential harms.127 In the realm of media law and policy, this
kind of content regulation is highly prone to legitimacy problems
by rationality. As a matter of principle, no significant dispute exists
over the moral legitimacy of such rules, since avoiding harms is
undoubtedly a legitimate goal of regulation (as something that the
public wants and needs).128 Thus, the political and constitutional
legitimacy of negative content duties is mostly a factual question,
rather than a normative one: what are the probability and the scale
of harm expected absent any regulation?
However, when the state uses its coercive powers in an
affirmative or prescriptive matter (for example, adopting positive
content duties or subsidizing preferred content), the matter
becomes more complicated and less consensual. Application of
positive content duties (which coerce the media to produce and
deliver “preferred content”) should be assessed as an affirmative or
perfectionist act, which usually rejects the liberal principle of state
neutrality. Although that kind of regulatory duties is not
categorically wrong, both policymakers and judicial review must
acknowledge the internal reservation of this political perspective:
perfectionist liberalism considers the use of the state’s coercive
power to be illegitimate (compared to non-coercive measures, such

126

This standard compares the benefits and risks of the ‘harmful’ speech with the
benefits and harms of the governmental suppression.
127
See infra Part II.C.
128
See Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91. SO.
CAL. L. REV. 195, 197 (2018).
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as subsidies or public broadcast).129 Moreover, positive content
duties are often motivated not only by the desire to expand any
valuable way of life but also by the assumption that particular
media content is better or more desirable to society than others
are.130
Based on this argument, it is possible to draw some guiding
principles for evaluating the political legitimacy of state power that
is used for distributive or perfectionist components of the public
interest in the media:
(a) Within the framework of liberal perfectionism, coercion is
considered the inferior option for pursing perfectionist ends.131
Thus, the use of direct content regulation needs to be justified over
other means for allocative regulation, such as subsidies or public
service media. (b) Since perfectionist liberalism departs from the
constitutional framework of individual rights and their possible
violation, we cannot judge the legitimacy of perfectionist use of
state power (such as positive content duties) without developing
new analytical tools. When it comes to evaluating the legitimacy of
the suppressive or restrictive regulatory duties over media and
content, the good old harm principle serves as a consensual
standard. However, in evaluating the permissive or prescriptive use
of state power to regulate media and content, we need to define its
own intrinsic reason and conditions for legitimacy, without
resorting to ideological dispositions about the relative importance
of liberty and equality. That is the power of the rationality
condition, which can be applied contextually to the rationales of
129

See supra note 131. For the distinction between coercive and non-coercive means of
media regulation, see Sunstein, supra note 34, at 505.
130
A prime example in theory and practice of media regulation and free speech
jurisprudence, is that political speech (such as the printed and electronic press) is
considered of higher social value (hence, more protected against regulation), compared to
fictional or irrational entertainment of popular culture. For the reluctance of the
democratic theory to grant popular culture and mass media with the same constitutional
protection of the press, see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
131
See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 157 (1993); see also Wall, supra note 103
(“Most perfectionist writers accept that sometimes the state can permissibly use coercion
to promote the good. Still, coercion is in general a clumsy device for pursuing
perfectionist ends.”).
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various regulatory duties. Only after identifying the specific
rationale that justifies given regulatory duties, the review process
can proceed to examine the substantial part of the rationality
condition—facts and evidence—since different justification
requires different facts to assert legitimacy.
2. Every Regulation Requires Facts
In any version of liberalism, a foundational condition for the
political legitimacy of using the state’s coercive power is the
rationality requirement: the use (or absence) of regulatory powers
must be supported by social facts, in contrast to pure-moral
arguments (and as opposed to sovereign arbitrariness).132 The
importance of social facts for evaluating the legitimacy of state
power is also a fundamental notion of legal realism.133 Thus, both
rights-based and welfare approaches to constitutional rights agree
that public policy and legal rules must rely on facts and data (that
social sciences supply), since regulating speech on the basis of
mere ideology is suspected as politically immoral or instrumentally
flawed.
The kind of social facts that are essential for evaluating the
political or constitutional legitimacy of specific media law and
policy depends on the factual premises of the particular reason that
underlies the reviewed regulatory duty. The most relevant sources
of data and facts in the context of media regulation are the social
sciences and media studies. Over the last decades, scientific
research produced over 10,000 theoretical and empirical studies
about the various effects, of various media, on various
audiences.134 By utilizing research methods of the social sciences
132
Both classical liberalism and perfectionist versions of liberalism support this
position. See Joseph Raz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF
LAW AND POLITICS 210 (1995) (“All law is source-based . . . . A law is source-based if its
existence and content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort
to any evaluative argument.”).
133
See Rosco Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 510–13 (1911) (jurists must take account of the “social facts” to which
various legal institutions apply and evaluate “the actual social effects of legal institutions
and doctrines”).
134
See Potter, supra note 54, at 12.
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(experiments, observations, surveys, statistical analysis, and
content analysis), the discipline of media studies supplies essential
data and facts about the power and influence of the media.
The importance of facts in policy making or in the process of
judicial review may seem trivial; and indeed, it should. However,
the century-long experience in media regulation and its judicial
review demonstrates an ongoing tendency to base the regulatory
reasoning on unfounded beliefs or assumptions about the media
and their audiences.135
In the case of prohibiting or suppressing regulation, the factual
insights that contemporary social sciences (and media studies in
particular) supply undermines many common assumptions about
the media’s unique power to harm individuals and society. For
example, studies showing that the media have a limited effect on
the attitudes or behavior of their audience136 might rule out the
political and constitutional legitimacy of media law and policy
based on the harm principle, by suggesting that no compelling
interest exists to regulate to so-called “harmful” content or
medium.137
It is not possible to describe the full scope of facts revealed by
the contemporary research on media effect. That said, a focus on
most recent literature uncovers that traditional assumptions about
the media’s omnipotent power to influence their audiences are

135
See MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 564; see also POTTER, supra note 54, at xv
(describing the public discussion about harmful media effects as based on “unfounded
beliefs rather than on sold knowledge”).
136
For examples, see infra Table 2.
137
The special importance of social facts as a condition for political and constitutional
legitimacy is exemplified by the ‘substantial evidence requirement’ of free speech
jurisprudence. If the government interest is sufficiently important in the abstract, the
government still “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). For the importance
and flaws of the substantial evidence requirement regarding new forms of mass media
(since the core claims of proponents and opponents are difficult to test systematically
against historical empirical evidences), see Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 168.
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highly contested.138 In fact, recent literature that adopts metaanalysis of the aggregated empirical data about the effects of
various types of media use supplies important social facts about the
media’s relatively weak “harmful” effects.139 Most of the common
assumptions about the harmful power of the media lack a sufficient
rational basis, as the causality between media consumption and
harmful effects is relatively weak.140 These findings, along with
other contemporary meta-analysis research, demonstrate that,
although the media’s impact may be significant, it is not very
substantial, since the variance accounted for by media exposure is
quite small.141 Moreover, these recent findings show that the
media’s pro-social effects are significantly higher than their
harmful effects.142
These examples of relevant empirical social facts, which
should guide the rationality condition for political legitimacy, add
to the broader insights of contemporary media studies, by which
the public and governmental perception of risk with regard to the
media is mostly a “moral panic” based on little evidence of the
media’s actual harmful effects.143 As contemporary literature
suggests:
Despite hopeful as well as fearful scenarios, the
passing of decades does not seem to have changed
the tendency of public opinion both the blame the
media and to demand that they do more to solve

138

NORMAN L. MEDOFF & BARBARA K. KAYE, ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THEN, NOW, AND
LATER 1404 (3d ed. 2016); ELIZABETH PERSE & JENNIFER LABME, MEDIA EFFECTS AND
SOCIETY (2017).
139
Patti Valkenburg et al., Media Effects: Theory and Research, 67 ANN. REV. OF
PSYCHOL. 315, 318 (2016).
140
Id. Of thirty-four behaviors studied in nineteen analyses, just three showed moderate
or greater correlations between media exposure and negative outcomes. Id.
141
See PERSE & LAMBE, supra note 138, at 8.
142
See Valkenburg, supra note 139, at 318; PERSE & LAMBE, supra note 138, at 8.
143
The term ‘moral panic’ was originally applied to a sudden expression of irrational
mass anxiety and social concern about crime, disorder, or social breakdown. As McQuail
explains, both the televised medium of the 20th century and new form of media (such as
the internet or computer games) generates moral panic at alleged harm to their users. See
MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 564.
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society’s ill. There are successive instances of alarm
relating to the media, whenever an insoluble or
inexplicable social problem arises. The most
constant element has been a negative perception of
the media—especially the inclination to link media
portrayals of crime, sex and violence with the
seeming increase in social and moral disorder.
These waves of alarm have been called ‘moral
panics’, partly because they are based on little
evidence either of media cause or actual effect.144
This brief review of the empirical and sociological sources of
data and social facts does not lead to the conclusion that all harmbased justifications for media regulation are irrational or flawed.
Rather, the argument of this Section about the critical contribution
of social facts to the condition of rationality is that the centurylong experience with media regulation teaches us a valuable lesson
about the public and governmental evaluation biases regarding the
risks and benefits of emerging communicative technologies. The
sociological insights about the media and its regulation show that
both government and public opinion tend to view the media as a
problem or scapegoat for deep social ills,145 thereby creating fertile
grounds for unique suppressive regulation over the media.
Hence, the condition of rationality (as the demand to base
policies and regulations on social facts) has a critical function in
media regulation due to the century-long experience with
regulating, which demonstrates a consistent tendency to overvalue
the risks from new communicative technologies—as a primary

144

See MCQUAIL 2010, supra note 17, at 55. See also POTTER, supra note 54, at xv
(describing the public discussion about harmful media effects as based on “unfounded
beliefs rather than on sold knowledge”).
145
For the most recent literature in this context, see PERSE & LAMBE, supra note 138, at
7 (“Although some politicians are motivated to promote public interest and media
responsibility, others see media as convenient and easily understood scapegoats for social
problems. Although there certainly are reasons to be concerned about the level of
violence in our society, it is clearly simplistic and misleading to hold that violent themes
in popular music, movies, comics book or television might be the major cause for
delinquency and the violent crime rate.”).
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justification for governmental regulation of it, in the name of the
public interest.146 Present regulations of mass-communicative
technologies (such as IPTV, Netflix, YouTube, and Facebook) can
avoid past mistakes, namely the tendency to base public policy or
legal reasoning on unfounded beliefs about the unique harmful
power of the media. Moreover, even if the shared beliefs about
television’s power to influence viewers against their will had
sufficient rational basis, this does not seem to be the case with
regard to the new media of the twenty-first century.147
In conclusion, the argument of this Section is not about the
factual question about the scope and extent of the risk that the
media pose to individuals or society. The argument here concerns
the methods to evaluate the legitimacy of specific regulatory duties
by demanding substantive evidence for the necessity of using the
state’s coercive powers in the name of the public interest. In this
context, rationality—as a consensual condition of political and
constitutional legitimacy—of state power requires a two-step
analysis: (1) identifying the specific justification which supports
the reviewed regulatory duty and (2) confronting the underlying
factual assumptions of the relevant justification with relevant
social facts about the subjects of regulation: the media and their
audiences.

146

For literature identifying the governmental tendency to frame new communication
technologies as dangerous to society, since those new ways of communication have
unique potential to disrupt the established power relations in society, see HAROLD INNIS,
EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATION (1950); BRIAN WINSTON, MISUNDERSTANDING MEDIA
(1986). For the general argument about the human biases in assessing the expected harm
of speech or information, see Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 93, at 366–78.
147
New media are considered weaker in their ability to persuade or inform the public,
due to the selectivity of the view as a user. See, e.g., MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at
545 (in the age of new media, “[t]here is no longer any unitary ‘message system’ to
which people are routinely and consistently exposed, leading to stereotypes or consensual
values. Individuals are no longer restricted by their immediate social group and the
physical availability of a few media channels, controlled by authorities and other
agencies”). See Peter Bajomi-Lazar, Audience Resistance: Reasons to Relax Content
Regulation, in MEDIA FREEDOM AND PLURALISM 175 (Beata Klimkeiwicz ed., 2010) (in
the political economy of online content, the media no longer dictate public taste and
opinions, but rather are affected by it—due to the selectivity powers of their audiences).
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Indeed, consensus exists that social facts must inform policymaking. However, the century-long experience with media
regulation teaches us that judicial review of emerging
communicative technologies’ regulation should adopt a healthy
sense of skepticism about the necessity of such regulation. In
contrast to the existing legal discussion, this call for suspicion does
not stem from a conservative or libertarian position, favoring
individual liberty over equality and distributive considerations, but
from ideology-neutral instrumental considerations: first, it is
impossible to ignore the natural tendency of both governmental
and private power-brokers to resist social changes that inherently
threaten their status. Thus, since speech (and especially massspeech platforms) comprises an engine of change, skepticism is
needed with regard to both the suppressive and prescriptive
regulation of media or their content in the name of the liberal harm
principle. Second, the demand for skepticism and social facts about
the necessity of media regulation stems from the non-legal
findings, which indicate the government’s consistent bias to
overestimate the risks and underestimate the social value of the
media and their outputs.
Based on those instrumental considerations, the general
argument of this Section about the condition of rationality is that
legal reasoning about the legitimacy of media regulation must be
undertaken contextually, by identifying the various factual
assumptions of the various justifications. This contextual
examination must be conducted in light of the social facts
emerging from the relevant non-legal fields of knowledge, which
provide a necessary tool for assessing the rationality of state
intervention. Simply put, even if regulation might be a necessary
friend of free speech, judicial review must examine the necessity of
regulation as a factual matter, by relying on facts and data that
contemporary social sciences supply.
C. Proportionality: The Hidden Trade-offs Between Liberty,
Equality, and Diversity in Media Regulation
In political and legal discourse, the principle of proportionality
is used as a criterion of fairness and justice, or as a logical method
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intended to assist in discerning the correct balance between
individual rights and collective needs.148 In the constitutional
domain, the principle of proportionality stems from the notion that
constitutional rights are not absolutes, since they can be violated if
there is a good enough reason for doing so, namely for the
protection of other individual rights or to achieve collective social
needs (or the wellbeing of society).149
This Section frames the concept of proportionality as a
consensual condition for political legitimacy in the context of
media regulation and its judicial review. In this context,
proportionality can be framed as the demand for accommodation
of competing rights, interests, or values that are associated with the
media and its regulation.150 Unlike common free speech
jurisprudence, which focuses on proportionality between
individual rights and public interest, I suggest here that the
proportionality of specific regulatory duties should be evaluated
with sensitivity to the conflicts and tensions between the core
values of media law and policy: liberty, equality, and diversity.
Within this framework, the ties and frictions between the values of
liberty and equality are well-known as the liberal divide between
utilitarian and distributive theories of justice. Alongside the
familiar ties and frictions between liberty and equality, both
positive and normative theories of the mass media identify
diversity as a distinct social value or a regulatory end.

148

See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE
L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015).
149
For the role of the proportionality principle within a non-absolute perception of
constitutional rights, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY (2012). For a discussion of
the relationship between absolute rights and the principle of proportionality, see Gregoire
Webber, Proportionality and Absolute rights, in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS,
NEW CHALLENGES (Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet eds., 2016).
150
The American Supreme Court consistently rejects the concept of “balancing” in the
context of judicial review. See Tsesis, supra note 113. With that, the categorical approach
which the Court adopts for resolving First Amendment cases does adhere to the principle
of proportionality (as considering the social benefits and costs of regulation), which is
embedded in the doctrines of overbreadth and the least restrictive mean requirement. For
identifying the various elements of proportionality in American constitutional law, see
generally Jackson, supra note 148.
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1. The Consensual Value of Diversity as a Mean and as an
End
In the literature from media studies and mass communication
theory, diversity is considered an independent factor by which the
performance of the media is evaluated, alongside liberty and
equality.151 The intrinsic value of diversity in media law and policy
(or as a third component of the public interest, alongside liberty
and equality) is not just as a means to achieve what the public
wants, but also as an essential component of what a democratic
society needs. Thus, diversity stands very close to freedom and
equality as a key concept in any discussion of media law and
policy (and as a key value of free speech as a democratic principle
and a constitutional right).152
Alternatively, the value of diversity in media outlets and
outputs can be described as non-intrinsic, but rather interrelated to
various aspects of liberty or equality. As McQuail suggests, the
main public benefits expected from diversity (as a means or as an
end) are paving the way for a social and cultural change; providing
a check on the misuse of freedom; enabling minorities to maintain
their existence in a larger society; limiting social conflicts by
increasing the chances of understanding between potentially
opposed groups and interest; and maximizing the benefits of the

151

See, e.g., FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 59 (“Diversity (both political and
cultural) is a considered as a separate, free-standing rationale for media regulation”);
MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 192–98 (framing diversity as an independent principle
of media structure and performance, alongside freedom and equality, and describing the
benefits of diversity to society as paving the way for social and cultural change).
152
See FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 82 (“Both ‘paternalists’, who seek a
‘properly informed’ public, and libertarians who emphasis choice, share an objective of
diversity in media output. The common ground is that diversity is desirable, the
difference is in response to the question ‘why?’ [ . . . ] If diversity in media output is
universally valued, and if it cannot necessarily be guaranteed without regulation, then
media regulation targeted at diversity appears to be justified”); Id. at 112 (within the
democratic justification for media regulation, “the plurality of the media is pursued not as
an end in itself, but as a means of furthering effective choice, as a prerequisite of
meaningful citizenship”). See also Goodman supra note 58, at 1230 (noting that the
Supreme Court characterized diverse speech as “a principal instrumental goal, rather than
merely an underlying value, of the First Amendment”).

854

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:803

free marketplace of ideas.153 In any case, both the utilitarian
market-based approach and the democracy-based approach to
media regulation share the objective of diversity in the media
output (in order to satisfy consumer’s diverse preferences or to
ensure vibrant and robust public discourse). Thus, the value of
diversity is highly consensual, though at times diversity of outputs
can be countered by other contradictory objectives.154
2. The Need to Proportionately Accommodate Liberty,
Equality, and Diversity
As the discussion in Part II demonstrated, the foundational
divide between the competing reasons for media regulation
revolves around the relative value of individual liberty and
collective needs. Within this framework, judicial review of
regulatory duties is usually constructed as a balance between the
costs of regulation (infringements of the media’s constitutional
rights) and its gains for the greater good or the public interest.155
The argument in this Section suggests that this common
framework of proportionality fails to recognize the hidden social
costs of media regulation, which might promote one aspect of the
public interest while simultaneously harming another aspect of the
public interest (and not just the media’s constitutional rights). By
adding the independent value of diversity to the binary framework
of liberty vs. equality, we can expose the hidden constitutional
costs of typical media regulation. As illustrated in Table 2, those
hidden costs are the inherent tradeoff between the consensual
components of the public interest in the media.

153

See MCQUAIL -2010, supra note 17, at 197.
For acknowledging diverse speech as a principle instrumental goal of the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court Decisions regarding broadcast and cable media, see
Goodman, supra note 58, at 1230.
155
See Goodman, supra note 58, at 1254 (“when there are competing First Amendment
interests on both sides of the equation, the key question becomes one of proper fit
between speech benefits and burdens”).
154
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TRADEOFFS BETWEEN LIBERTY, EQUALITY,

The public-interest value that The hidden cost of regulation
regulation promotes
vis-à-vis other public-interest
values
Equality (of access and
Liberty
representation)
(The public interest in protecting
or
media freedom from
Diversity
(of
sources
and content)
governmental/majoritarian
coercion)
Liberty
(The public interest in protecting
media freedom from
Equality (of access and
governmental/majoritarian
representation)
coercion)
or
Diversity (of sources and content)
Liberty
(the public interest to keep the
media free from
Diversity (of sources and content)
governmental/majoritarian
coercion)
or
Equality (of access and
representation)

The inherent tradeoffs between liberty and equality are well
known to political theory and free speech jurisprudence.156 With
that, the present discussion exposes the hidden constitutional costs
of media regulation within the public interest framework.

156

See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 143 (2010).
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a) When the state uses its coercive powers over the media
to pursue equality and diversity, then liberty must be
compromised.
As elaborated in the previous section, both the market-based
and democracy-based perceptions of the public interest with regard
to commercial media assume that “full liberty” (i.e., no regulation)
results in undesirable consequences to the diversity of media
outlets and outputs. Thus, limiting the liberty of the media—for the
sake of either correcting market failures or promoting the
democratic values of equality and diversity—triggers the wellknown conflict with individual negative liberty.
The hidden constitutional costs of media regulation can be
described by examining the other combinations:
b) When the state uses its coercive powers over the media
to pursue liberty and equality, then diversity must be
compromised (as is the case with free/broadcast-like
media) / When the state uses its coercive powers over
the media to pursue liberty and diversity, then equality
must be compromised (as is the case with premium
pay-based media).
The liberal cost of pursuing both egalitarian values and
diversity of media outputs is often hidden from both the utilitarianeconomic and rights-based perspectives. It can be exemplified by
comparing subscription-based media (i.e., cables, Netflix, and
magazines) and “free” media services (i.e., broadcast television,
YouTube, and free newspapers). “Free” media services, which do
not exclude people from their outputs, greatly promote the
egalitarian component of the public interest. However, “free”
mass-media services are limited in their ability to supply quality or
a diversity of media outputs in comparison to pay-based media.
Respectably, the practical lesson from the century-long regulation
of commercial media is that regulatory policy seeking to promote
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free media services diminishes the amount, diversity, or quality of
media products. 157
As an answer to this often-hidden tension between the values
of equality and diversity in the context of media law and policy,
the proportionality requirement must be further developed in order
to acknowledge these often-hidden tradeoffs. The argument here is
instrumental, rather than normative, as it does not weigh in on the
relative importance or priority of the social values that justice
demands. Rather, it argues that decision-making about the
constitutional legitimacy of specific regulation must weigh the
unavoidable trade-offs between the competing values that guide
media regulation and free speech jurisprudence.
The discussion above illustrates that there is a high degree of
reciprocity between the multiple values that comprise the public
interest in the media. However, despite the interrelations between
freedom, equality, and diversity—as the core values of the public
interest in media law and policy—these values are often mutually
exclusive: state promotion of any two such values usually comes at
the expense of the third. This understanding is critical for current
theory and doctrine, as they focus only on comparing the expected
benefits of regulation to the public interest with its burden on the
rights and interests of regulated media.
This understanding of the hidden trade-offs between the
various components of the public interest is not just theoretical.
Within current First Amendment doctrine, judicial review
evaluates the constitutional legitimacy of speech regulation by the

157

The economic explanation to this tradeoff is based on the nature of ‘free’ media
services as public goods (characterized by non-rival use and the inability to exclude) and
as commercial products with near-zero marginal costs (whose first-copy cost is very
high). See Cristopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52
EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003). A recent example can be found in the decisions of online
premium content outlets to adopt a pay-based business model, to insure the diversity or
quality, which ‘free’ media services are limited in their ability to supply. See Ricardo
Bilton, Learning from the New Yorker, Wired’s new paywall aims to build a more “stable
financial future,” NIEMANLAB (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/02
/learning-from-the-new-yorker-wireds-new-paywall-aims-to-build-a-more-stablefinancial-future [https://perma.cc/D7HR-36EA].
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“narrowly-tailored” or “the least restrictive means” tests of strict
scrutiny, which are in fact measures for evaluating proportionality
of government regulation.158 With that, First Amendment doctrine
favors rights over values (and negative liberties over positive
ones).159 Thus, in evaluating the constitutional legitimacy of any
media law or policy (or in balancing free speech values), judicial
review and its doctrine should consider the full constitutional costs
of media regulation: media regulation not only compromises the
speech rights of the commercial media outlets (as the direct
subjects of regulation), but might also compromise the various,
often-competing components of the public interest in the media.160
Adopting this framework of proportionality for acknowledging
the full scope of the regulatory burden between various
components of the public interests would benefit both marketbased and democracy-based sides of the liberal spectrum. Whether
we seek to better inform our cost/benefit analysis or find the just
balance between individual rights and the collective interest, we
must expand our view of the regulatory burden, which is usually
focused on the regulated media. Considering the plurality of aims
and social values which compose “the public interest” in regulating
the various new forms of digital media, decision-making about its
legitimacy must be well-informed about its consequences on
various aspects of society’s well-being. Due to the consequentialist
nature of both market-based and democracy-based methods of
158

See Jackson, supra note 148, at 3096.
See Goodman, supra note 58, at 1218. The notable exception to this judicial
reasoning is Justice Breyer’s balancing approach, which rejects the categorical treatment
of public-interest regulation of commercial media as presumptively constitutional or
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
160
Evidence of this approach in First Amendment jurisprudence can be seen in Justice
Breyer’s balancing method of review, as “the beginnings of a more pragmatic and
contextualized review of laws that implicate speech interests on both sides.” See
Goodman, supra note 58, at 1252–56 (referring to Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2010), in which he argued for “proportionality
review” in contrast to the existing doctrine of categorical reasoning). For other recent
cases in which the Court engaged in balancing without resorting to categorical analysis,
see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443 (2011).
159
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reasoning about legitimacy, accurate accounting of the potential
gains and losses of regulation on both individual liberty and
collective needs of society must be done. This framework of
proportionality or balancing is not ad hoc decision-making, but
rather a value-plural, fact-based method to appropriately balance
the expected gains and losses of present and future regulations of
communication and information services.
CONCLUSION
Over the last century, market-based and democracy-based
rationales have fought each other about the sources and constraints
of government interventions in media markets. At present, as was
the case in the previous century, the rapid changes in
communication technologies present new challenges for First
Amendment jurisprudence and media regulation. This Article
focuses on the instrumental functions of public law and judicial
review for securing the political legitimacy of the many possible
uses of state power in regulating the media. At its core, the
discussion here focuses on the question of legitimacy, common to
political theory and constitutional law: how should the rightful use
of political power be distinguished from illegitimate coercion?
That question is of much importance now, as it was with regard to
the old media, as both market-based and distributive/democracybased rationales for speech regulation acknowledge that they
concern not only the rights of speakers, but also the collective
interest (or values) of a democratic and free society.
Since the various rationales and objectives for regulatory
interventions seem contradictory and inconsistent, the most
important lesson from the century-long experience of media
regulation is that evaluation of specific policies or regulations
requires clarity as to the values and principles that should guide
public policy and its judicial review. The ambiguity (or competing
perceptions) of “the public interest” as a political or legal concept
is unacceptable in the context of media regulation and free speech.
Absent the setting of clear objectives, the existence of a reasonable
divide about the underlying raison d’etre of media regulation
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makes its legitimacy challenging to assess. Hence, treating media
regulation as presumptively constitutional or unconstitutional lacks
the sufficient sensitivity in contextualizing litigants’ various
interests and the impacts of regulation on the well-being of
individuals and society at large.
Through the lens of political theory, we can understand how
current debates over (both old and new) media regulation are
divided on an ideological sphere between the egalitarian and
libertarian ends of the liberal spectrum (or over the relative
importance of liberty and equality in a liberal democracy). By
acknowledging those divides in the theory and the practice of
media regulation, this Article exposes the problems free speech
jurisprudence and judicial review in evaluating the legitimacy or
permissibility of specific regulations.
In response, this Article proposes a fact-based, contextsensitive framework for examining the constitutional legitimacy or
permissibility of media regulation. It aims to enrich the legal
discourse on freedom of speech by offering sociological and
empirical perspectives on the media regulation, while also
contributing to the broader issue of the regulation of public
discourse and judicial review of such governmental actions.
Building on the insights of political theory and the social sciences,
the inter-disciplinary approach exemplified in this paper supplies a
value-plural, fact-based method to appropriately balance the
expected gains and losses of present and future regulations of
communication and information services.
Altogether, this Article strives to offer a refined understanding
of media regulation as a social phenomenon and a subject for
judicial review. The theoretical and practical discussion here
supplies the judge, the regulator, and the citizen with tools to
understand and evaluate the legitimacy or desirability of various
regulatory practices—present and future—through a structured,
fact-based method. Moreover, it exposes the essence of media
regulation as a socio-cultural arrangement that carries social costs,
which are sometimes hidden from political or judicial view.

